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The Kantian Image of Thought: Beyond Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Analysis of Presuppositions  
EDWARD THORNTON  
In this paper I will argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis of Kantian 
philosophy fails to recognise an essential and radical aspect of Kant’s critical 
metaphysics. Specifically, I will show that Deleuze and Guattari’s examination of 
the objective and subjective presuppositions that appear in the history of 
philosophy – and their evaluation of various philosophers on the grounds of their 
relationships with these two kinds of presuppositions – ignores the specific nature 
of the transcendental presuppositions that Kant introduces in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. What this means is that, while Deleuze and Guattari are correct to point 
out that Kant’s critical metaphysics relies on a pre-philosophical ‘image of 
thought’, they are incorrect to say that Kant’s presumption of such an image is 
nothing but a subjective presupposition.1 However, my own critique of Deleuze 
and Guattari is not intended to be absolute, and the final section of the paper will 
offer an opportunity for reconciliation between Deleuze and Guattari’s later 
characterisations of philosophy, as involving both ‘the creation of concepts’ and 
‘the instituting of the plane’, with Kant’s transcendental deduction of the unity of 
reason.2  
 
 By concentrating on what Deleuze and Guattari fail to appreciate in Kant’s 
philosophy, this examination is intended to bring to light some of the peculiarities 
of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and thus to offer some original reflections on 
the possibility of the science of metaphysics that Kant attempts to introduce. The 
 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 
2004), p. 172, hereafter DR. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. 
by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 
52-53, hereafter WIP.  
2 WIP, p. 41. 
present paper will include four sections. First, I will offer an exposition of 
Deleuze’s early evaluation of Kant, as it appears in Difference and Repetition and 
Kant’s Critical Philosophy. Here Kant is charged with the crime of drawing out 
transcendental structures from an empirical psychology, and thus of importing a 
set of implicit presuppositions into his metaphysics.3 Second, I will turn to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s later analysis of Kant in What is Philosophy? and show 
that Deleuze’s early claim, that Kant’s transcendental method is based on an 
unfounded set of subjective presuppositions, is never rescinded. Third, I will look 
closely at Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and will offer an explanation of Kant’s 
transcendental deduction of the unity of reason. This analysis will allow me to 
show what is unique about Kant’s presupposition of the unity of reason, namely 
that it is defended through the use of a transcendental deduction. Finally, I will 
look again at some comments in What is Philosophy? concerning the 
philosophical practice of instituting a plane of immanence.4 Here I will show that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s mature philosophy has all of the conceptual tools required 
to explain the originality of Kant’s first critique, and that by more strictly 
differentiating the practice of presupposing a plane from that of instituting a 
plane, we can use Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis to show what is unique about 
Kant’s own attempt to ground the science of metaphysics.  
 
 The sections of Deleuze and Guattari’s work that I will be addressing – 
especially the comments on presuppositions and the relationship they take to 
images of thought – explicitly concern the nature of philosophy and not the nature 
of metaphysics. However, there are good reasons to regard these sections as 
particularly concerned with metaphysics. First, the two major examples that 
Deleuze and Guattari take from the history of philosophy constitute two of the 
most pivotal moments in the history of Western metaphysics, namely Descartes’s 
attempt to ground first philosophy on the subject’s self-knowledge, and Kant’s 
critical reappraisal of the possibility of such a metaphysics. Second, the 
philosophical themes that Deleuze and Guattari cover in their discussions of the 
image of thought are unequivocally metaphysical: the question of where 
philosophy can begin, the question of the relationship of philosophical thought to 
its outside, and the question of the historical development of philosophical 
thinking. For these reasons, we are well-justified in taking Deleuze and Guattari’s 
 
3 DR, p. 171. 
4 WIP, p. 41. 
persistent concern with the nature of philosophical presuppositions as indicative 
of their engagement with what is normally called metaphysics. As such, this 
critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Kant’s presuppositions is well-
placed to offer insight into the nature of the science of metaphysics. 
 
I. Kant and The Dogmatic Image of Thought  
 
Deleuze’s approach to the history of philosophy in Difference and Repetition 
differs in many respects from the approach taken with Guattari in What is 
Philosophy?. However, both of these texts draw on a distinction between 
subjective presuppositions and objective presuppositions, first introduced in the 
third chapter of Difference and Repetition, titled ‘The Image of Thought’.5 Here 
Deleuze offers a sweeping analysis of the Western philosophical canon and 
describes how his project relates to this history. In effect, what Deleuze claims is 
that the discipline of philosophy has always defined itself by the activity of doing 
away with presuppositions: by inspecting their own thoughts, dispelling any 
unjustified beliefs, and by taking nothing for granted, the philosopher tries to 
attain knowledge which is certain. Unfortunately, according to Deleuze, while 
philosophers have been busy expelling their explicit or objective presuppositions, 
they have failed to recognise a hidden set of implicit or subjective 
presuppositions. Specifically, Deleuze claims, philosophers have always taken for 
granted, as a kind of common sense, a certain number of presuppositions about 
what it means to be a thinking agent. Taking Descartes’s Meditations as his major 
example, Deleuze writes that the innovation of Descartes’s cogito can be seen in 
his avoidance of any scholastic, objective presuppositions: if we define man as a 
rational animal, then we must presuppose the meanings of the concepts ‘man’ and 
‘rational’.  The cogito avoids any such explicit presuppositions but, according to 
Deleuze, it faces other issues: 
 
 
5 Deleuze’s critique of subjective presuppositions was heavily influenced by Feuerbach’s 
critique of Hegel’s presuppositionless logic. This point is made by Somers-Hall, who argues 
that ‘Feuerbach’s claim that “every system is only an expression or image of reason” can be 
seen as a forerunner of Deleuze’s own claim that representational thinking rests on an “image 
of thought”’ (Henry Somers-Hall, ‘Feuerbach and the Image of Thought’, in At The Edges of 
Thought: Deleuze and Post-Kantian Philosophy, ed. by Daniella Voss and Craig Lundy 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 264).  
[Descartes] does not escape presuppositions of another kind – subjective 
or implicit presuppositions contained in opinions rather than concepts: it is 
presumed that everyone knows, independently of concepts, what is meant 
by self, thinking, and being.6 
 
For Deleuze, ‘a subjective or implicit presupposition’ is any proposition 
which takes the form “Everybody knows...”’.7 Here Deleuze is not concerned 
with specific empirical claims which philosophers have taken for granted, but 
with methodological claims that concern the philosopher’s intimacy with 
thinking: we know what thinking is like, we know when we are thinking, and 
once we have reached a conclusion we will be able to recognise it. What the 
philosopher takes for granted in their implicit or subjective presuppositions is 
therefore ‘not a particular this or that but the form of representation or recognition 
in general’.8 For this reason, Deleuze will write that ‘conceptual philosophical 
thought has as its implicit presupposition a pre-philosophical and natural Image 
of thought, borrowed from the pure element of common sense’.9 
 
Overall, Deleuze outlines eight specific postulates that make up the most 
common implicit presuppositions of conceptual thinking.10 Taken together, these 
postulates compose what Deleuze names the ‘Image of Thought’, which is 
nothing other than the set of presuppositions which western philosophy has failed 
to expel. As Deleuze explains in an interview published in the same year as 
Difference and Repetition, the problem that we face as philosophers is that ‘we 
live with a particular image of thought, that is to say, before we begin to think, 
we have a vague idea of what it means to think’.11 In a move which commentators 
have viewed variously as brilliant and naïve,12 Deleuze then sets himself the task 
 
6 DR, p. 164. 
7 DR, p. 165. 
8 DR, p. 166. 
9 DR, p. 167. 
10 Namely the postulates of ‘the principle’, ‘the ideal’, ‘the model’, ‘the element’, ‘the 
negative’, ‘logical function’, ‘modality’, and ‘the end’ (DR, p. 207).  
11 Gilles Deleuze, ‘On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought’, Desert Islands and Other Texts 
1953-1974, ed. by David Lapoujade, and trans. by Michael Taormina (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2004), p. 139.  
12 For example, compare Toscano’s celebration of ‘Deleuze’s revolutionary project of a 
thought without an image’ (Alberto Toscano, ‘Everybody Thinks: Deleuze, Descartes and 
Rationalism’, Radical Philosophy (162) (2010), pp. 8-17) with Williams’ characterisation of 
this goal as an ‘impossible target’ (James Williams, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and 
of producing ‘a philosophy which would be without any kind of presuppositions’ 
that would find ‘its true beginning, not in an agreement with the pre-philosophical 
Image but in a rigorous struggle against this Image’.13  This is what Deleuze calls 
a ‘thought without image’ and it is this which he attempts to produce in the latter 
half of Difference and Repetition.14  
 
Deleuze turns to Kant as an example of a philosopher who was well 
equipped to overturn the dogmatic image of thought, but who nonetheless fell 
into the error of importing certain common-sense assumptions into his 
metaphysics. First Deleuze praises Kant for his discovery of ‘the prodigious 
domain of the transcendental’ by which he is able to reorientate philosophy away 
from problems of error or misrecognition – which presuppose that thinking is 
essentially representative – and towards problems of immanent illusion, such as 
the transcendental illusions created by reason itself.15 Deleuze also praises Kant 
for disrupting the preconceived notions of the subject, God, and the world, first 
by recognising the way in which the thinking subject, unlike the Cartesian cogito, 
is ‘profoundly fractured by a line of time’, and second by announcing the 
‘speculative death’ of God by showing that the concept of God has a regulative 
and not a constitutive role in thought.16 Deleuze’s praise is, however, quickly 
replaced with disappointment when he argues that ‘in spite of everything, and at 
the risk of compromising the conceptual apparatus of the three Critiques, Kant 
did not want to renounce the implicit presuppositions’.17 Specifically, Deleuze 
argues that Kant’s very distinction between the different faculties, and his 
assumption that each faculty has a rightful domain in thought so that they are able 
to work in harmony, are both based on assumptions drawn from empirical and 
common-sense notions of psychology. He writes that ‘Kant traces the so-called 
transcendental structures from the empirical acts of a psychological 
consciousness’ and in so doing he accepts a pre-philosophical image of thought 
as the basis for his metaphysical system. What is more, Deleuze argues that the 
three Kantian faculties of sensibility, understanding and reason are only able to 
cohere due to their collective capacity for ‘recognition’ which is expressed ‘in the 
 
Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2003), p.116).  
13 DR, p. 167. 
14 DR, p. 168. 
15 DR, p. 171. 
16 DR, p. 172. 
17 DR, p. 172. 
form of the unspecified object as correlate of the 'I think' to which all the faculties 
are related’.18  
 
Here Deleuze is extending a critique which he first raised in Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy. There Deleuze had attempted to provide a comprehensive account of 
Kant’s project by showing that the transcendental structures of the Critique of 
Pure Reason ultimately rely on the practical tasks of reason and on the synthesis 
of judgement. His point is that, because ‘the Ideas of reason are speculatively 
indeterminate, [yet] practically determined’, the Critique of Practical Reason 
grounds rather than builds on the first critique.19 Similarly, because both the first 
and the second Critiques offer outlines of different kinds of harmony between the 
faculties, and because ‘[e]very determinate accord indeed presupposes that the 
faculties are, at a deeper level, capable of a free and indeterminate accord’, it is 
the Critique of Judgement which grounds Kant’s entire critical project.20  
 
             Taking these texts together, it is possible to summarise Deleuze’s early 
evaluation of Kant’s first critique as follows: while Kant challenged the dogmatic 
image of thought by replacing the Cartesian cogito with a subject fractured by 
time, and while Kant’s analysis of the necessary preconditions for experience 
shifted the aim of philosophical work away from problems of recognition and 
towards the illusions created by thought itself, Kant reneged on the promise of 
his critical philosophy by assuming a harmony between the faculties. Despite 
Kant’s later work, which Deleuze praises so highly, Kant’s insistence on both the 
discreteness and harmony of the faculties means that his philosophy repeats 
certain dogmas that are drawn from what ‘everybody knows’ concerning the good 
nature of thought. For this reason, Deleuze will write that ‘Kantian Critique is 
ultimately respectful: knowledge, morality, reflection and faith are supposed to 
correspond to natural interests of reason, and are never themselves called into 
question’.21 What is most important for our purposes here, and what I will come 
back to later in this paper, is that Deleuze accuses Kant of grounding his whole 
philosophy on a subjective or implicit presupposition regarding the harmonious 
unity of thought. For Deleuze, Kant’s assumption that the different faculties of 
 
18 DR, p. 171. 
19 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habberjam (London: Althone Press, 1984), p. 52. 
20 Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, pp. 23-24. 
21 DR, p. 173. 
thought can form a harmonious unity is, in the end, nothing but an assumption. 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze attempts to go beyond Kant, to examine 
the discord of the faculties, and to argue that in this conflict it is possible to find 
not only the necessary preconditions for the possibility of experience, but the 
preconditions for its genesis.22 
 
II. The Kantian Image of Thought 
While Difference and Repetition ultimately presents Kant’s critical philosophy as 
a failure that does not live up to its radical promise, Deleuze’s later mentions of 
Kant focus more on an appreciation of his originality. One way to capture this 
shift is to recognise Deleuze’s move from an analysis of the dogmatic image of 
thought to an interest in the various images of thought produced by different 
thinkers. While in Difference and Repetition Deleuze is clear that he is not 
interested in ‘this or that image of thought, variable according to the philosophy 
in question, but of a single Image in general which constitutes the subjective 
presupposition of philosophy as a whole’, elsewhere Deleuze treats each 
philosopher as creating their own image of thought.23 In a number of interviews, 
and in his first works with Guattari, Deleuze will speak of the process whereby a 
philosopher inherits an image of thought from their predecessors, but who then 
challenges the presuppositions left to them: ‘someone comes along and proposes 
another idea, a whole other image’.24 For example, Deleuze will claim in an 
interview: ‘Hume, Bergson, and Proust interest me so much because in their work 
can be found profound elements for a new image of thought’.25 Deleuze’s book 
on Nietzsche is also filled with references to a ‘new image of thought’ that would 
be nomadic and creative.26 At other points, Deleuze refers to the specific 




22 DR, p. 176. 
23 DR, p. 167. 
24 Deleuze, ‘On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought’, p. 139. 
25 Deleuze, ‘On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought’, p. 139. 
26 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Continuum, 
2002), p. 104. 
27 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. by Brian Massumi 
(London: Continuum, 2004), p. 415; Gilles Deleuze, ‘Humans: A Dubious Existence’, Desert 
Islands and Other Texts 1953-1974, ed. by David Lapoujade, and trans. by Michael Taormina 
(Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), p. 93. 
By the time that Deleuze and Guattari write A Thousand Plateaus, the pair 
no longer aspire to avoid all presuppositions. Here, rather than attempting to 
simply escape from the Image of Thought, Deleuze and Guattari set out to 
experiment with the production of a new image of thought.28 They characterise 
what Deleuze had previously referred to as the Image of Thought as operating by 
the use of binary and exclusive disjunctions and they name this the ‘arborescent’ 
image of thought, adding that ‘the tree and root inspire a sad image of thought’.29 
In contrast to this, Deleuze and Guattari attempt to produce an alternative mode 
of thinking, which relies on the use of inclusive disjunctions.30 Deleuze and 
Guattari name this the ‘rhizomatic’ image of thought.31 So, while the third chapter 
of Difference and Repetition characterises the majority of the history of the 
western philosophical canon as a kind of failure for its inability to escape the 
image of thought, and while it sets up Deleuze’s project as an attempt to find a 
thought without image, in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari give up on 
the possibility of attaining this presuppositionlessness and instead decide to 
experiment with an alternative set of implicit presuppositions. This is how 
 
28 Jonathan Dronsfield somewhat dramatically refers to this shift as marking ‘a schism in the 
work of Gilles Deleuze’, claiming that ‘to seek out a “new image of thought” is utterly at 
odds with the necessity of “destroying” the image of thought and of coming up with a 
“thought without image”’ (‘Deleuze and the Image of Thought’, Philosophy Today, 56:4 
(2012), pp. 404-414). I am inclined to see the shift as a continuation rather than an absolute 
break. Deleuze and Guattari still allow for the possibility of a thought without image, but they 
rule out the possibility that philosophy can operate on these grounds. Their production of a 
rhizomatic image of thought is an attempt to produce an image of thought that can maintain 
relations with an imageless thought, which is otherwise only possible outside of philosophy. 
Speaking of their own project in A Thousand Plateaus, they say that ‘the outside has no 
image, no signification, no subjectivity’ but refer to their own book as an ‘assemblage with 
the outside’ (Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 25).  
29 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 18. 
30 The concept of the inclusive disjunction is used by Deleuze and Guattari to reject the law 
of the excluded middle. In Logic of Sense, Deleuze makes a distinction between exclusive 
disjunctions, in which two different options are set up against each other and where one must 
be selected in favour of the other, and inclusive disjunctions, in which two options differ from 
one another without being opposed, and which can thus both be affirmed together. An 
inclusive disjunction is defined as ‘an operation according to which two things or two 
determinations are affirmed through their difference, that is to say, that they are objects of 
simultaneous affirmation only in so far as their difference is itself affirmed and is itself 
affirmative’ (Logic of Sense, trans. by Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (London: Continuum, 
2004), p. 197). This concept is central to Deleuze and Guattari’s work in Anti-Oedipus (pp. 
84-86) and is also behind their rejection of the ‘binary logic of dichotomy’ in A Thousand 
Plateaus (pp. 5-6). 
31 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 7. 
Deleuze describes the shift in a preface he wrote in 1986 for the English edition 
of Difference and Repetition: 
 
[I]n [Difference and Repetition] it seemed to me that the powers of 
difference and repetition could be reached only by putting into question the 
traditional image of thought… It is therefore the third chapter which now 
seems to me the most necessary and the most concrete, and which serves 
to introduce subsequent books up to and including the research undertaken 
with Guattari where we invoked a vegetal model of thought: the rhizome 
in opposition to the tree, a rhizome-thought instead of an arborescent 
thought.32 
 
While Deleuze and Guattari draw heavily on Kant in their collaborations, 
they tend to avoid passing judgement on Kant’s metaphysics as a whole.33 
However, by the time Deleuze and Guattari come to write What is Philosophy?, 
they return to Kant’s work, and specifically to his Critique of Pure Reason, as a 
key example in their account of philosophical thinking. Here Deleuze and 
Guattari refuse to give up on the idea that Kant’s first critique relies on an 
illegitimate set of implicit or subjective presuppositions, but they do forgive Kant 
these presuppositions as being part and parcel of his larger and more creative task. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s decision to relax their critique of Kant comes alongside 
their decision to relax the conditions they set on themselves. As Miguel de 
Beistegui has explained: ‘What is Philosophy? seems to mark a shift from a 
fundamental aspect of Difference and Repetition, in so far as Deleuze and Guattari 
are now claiming that philosophy – including their own – can never quite shake 
off or determine entirely its own image: a purely imageless thought is but an 
illusion’.34 If Deleuze and Guattari are now able to look back on their project in 
A Thousand Plateaus and admit that it relied on certain subjective 
presuppositions, then they are willing to revisit Kant on similar grounds.  
 
 
32 DR, p. xv. 
33 For example, Deleuze claims that Anti-Oedipus ‘was Kantian in spirit’ because he and 
Guattari had ‘attempted a kind of Critique of Pure Reason for the unconscious’ (Two Regimes 
of Madness Texts and Interviews 1975-1995 (Paris: Semiotext(e), 2007), p. 309).  
34 Miguel de Beistegui, Immanence: Deleuze and Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010), p. 10. 
             In order to conceptually account for this shift in perspective, in What is 
Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari reconceptualise the ‘image of thought’ as a 
‘plane of immanence’ of concepts.35 Here they famously define philosophy as the 
‘creation of concepts’, but this declaration also comes with the explanation that 
to create a new concept is to produce a new image of thought.36 Their description 
of it can be roughly summarised in the following way: concepts all interact in a 
mutually upholding web of interrelations; this web of concepts determines a field 
of thought, which regulates what it is possible to think; when, in an attempt to 
pose a new problem, a philosopher is forced to create a new concept, the 
introduction of this new concept into the conceptual field effects a reorientation 
of the whole web of interrelations. The name that Deleuze and Guattari give to 
the conceptual field of concept-relations is the ‘plane of immanence’, which they 
also refer to as an ‘image of thought’.37 They explain that ‘the plane of immanence 
is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the 
image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to 
find one's bearings in thought’.38 On this account, each philosopher is defined by 
the concept (or concepts) that they create, which in turn produces a new plane of 
immanence, or image of thought.  
 
According to this analysis, it is impossible to think philosophically without 
making certain presuppositions. They say that philosophy ‘proceeds by 
presupposing or by instituting the plane of immanence’ and that for this reason 
‘the instituting of philosophy merges with the presupposition of a 
prephilosophical plane’.39 Because of this, Deleuze and Guattari stop criticising 
the use of subjective presuppositions, and instead they begin to examine the 
degree of creativity that is required to invent new sets of subjective 
presuppositions. While Deleuze had taken Descartes and Kant as his two 
examples of failures in Difference and Repetition, here Deleuze and Guattari 
reappraise both thinkers on the grounds of their creativity: ‘There is no point in 
wondering whether Descartes was right or wrong. Are implicit and subjective 
presuppositions more valid than explicit objective presuppositions? Is it 
necessary ‘to begin’, and, if so, is it necessary to start from the point of view of a 
 
35 WIP, p. 37. 
36 WIP, p. 5. 
37 WIP, p. 37. 
38 WIP, p. 37. 
39 WIP, p. 42-44. 
subjective certainty?’.40 Speaking of Kant’s response to Descartes, Deleuze and 
Guattari say that ‘Kant constructs a “transcendental” plane that renders doubt 
useless and changes the nature of the presuppositions once again… Kant demands 
the introduction of a new component into the cogito, the one Descartes repressed 
– time’.41 By raising the philosophical problem of the necessary preconditions for 
subjective experience, Kant is said to have introduced the dimension of time into 
thought and thus brought about ‘a reorientation of the whole of thought’.42 In 
summary, Deleuze and Guattari praise Kant for altering the subjective 
presuppositions on which philosophical thinking must rely and in doing so 
creating a specifically Kantian image of thought.  
 
 What must be pointed out here, however, is that Deleuze and Guattari make 
no distinction between the kind of presuppositions made by each figure in the 
history of philosophy. According to their analysis, both Descartes and Kant go 
through the same procedure: they both expel their objective and explicit 
presuppositions, they both select a new set of subjective presuppositions which 
are implicit in their philosophical method, and they both create a new image of 
thought based on those presuppositions. The problem with this picture is that 
Descartes and Kant – to remain with the two examples on the table – do not make 
their presuppositions according to the same method at all. As we will see in the 
next section, Deleuze and Guattari are correct that Kant’s account of the science 
of metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason rests on a specific set of 
presuppositions, but they are wrong that these presuppositions are subjective, and 
they are wrong that they are implicit. On the contrary, what is so original about 
Kant’s transcendental method is the fact that he offers a defence of the 
presuppositions that he makes, explaining why these presuppositions – which he 
names ‘transcendental presuppositions’– must be made.43 
 
III. Transcendental Presuppositions and the Unity of Reason 
Kant’s use of presuppositions in the Critique of Pure Reason is rather odd, and 
the specific nature of his use of such presuppositions is not captured by Deleuze’s 
analysis of the Image of Thought or Deleuze and Guattari’s later analysis of 
 
40 WIP, p. 27. 
41 WIP, p. 31. 
42 WIP, p. 52. 
43 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (London: 
Macmillan, 1929), B679/A651, hereafter CPR. 
philosophy’s creation of various images of thought. In this section I will offer an 
account of Kant’s transcendental use of presuppositions in order to show that the 
plane of immanence of Kantian metaphysics is not presupposed, in the usual 
sense of the word.  
 
Like the majority of modern philosophers, Kant regularly reminds his 
reader that nothing should be presupposed in an argument that cannot be defended 
on its own grounds, lest it turn out to be untrue and jeopardise the whole 
endeavour. Kant warns the reader that any form of presupposition – be it 
‘hypothetical’ or ‘axiomatic’ – should be ‘treated as contraband’.44 To put this in 
the terminology of Kant’s first Critique, we might say that, if we wish to provide 
a foundation for metaphysics, then we must offer an analysis of what can be 
known a priori concerning the necessary conditions of our experience and that it 
is only by avoiding any reliance on contingent facts that we can reach our 
conclusions with apodictic certainty. To put this in the terminology of Difference 
and Repetition, Kant follows the standard philosophical line of attempting to 
expunge the objective and explicit presuppositions of his philosophical forebears.  
 
However, Kant’s relationship with presuppositions does not end here, and 
it would be hasty to assume that Kant simply falls into the trap that Deleuze 
recognises of ‘refusing objective presuppositions, but on condition of assuming 
just as many subjective presuppositions’.45 To see why, we need to look again at 
the structure of Kant’s arguments concerning presuppositions. What is most 
interesting for us here is that, unlike the vast majority of thinkers before him, Kant 
regularly found himself providing arguments in which presuppositions come at 
the end rather than the beginning of the argumentation, filling the place where we 
would normally expect to find the conclusion. To take the Critique of Pure Reason 
as a whole, we can say that Kant’s aim is to show that, starting from what is given 
to us in experience, it is possible to determine the necessary preconditions for the 
possibility of such an experience. Another way of putting this is to say that, if we 
begin with an analysis of the structure of experience, then it is possible for us to 
determine what must be presupposed in order to offer an account of the possibility 
of such a structure. In brief then, we can say that Kant distinguishes between two 
different kinds of presuppositions: there are those which come at the beginning 
 
44 CPR, Axvi. 
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of an argument and serve as an undefended and dangerous ground for 
argumentation, and there are those which come at the end of an argument and tell 
us what must be presupposed in order to account for something that we have 
already shown to be certain. I am going to suggest that we call the former of these 
‘prefatory-presuppositions’ and the latter ‘conclusory-presuppositions’. In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant regularly finds himself attempting to unearth and 
dispel prefatory-presuppositions and to replace them – often via the use of 
transcendental arguments – with conclusory-presuppositions. To translate this 
back into the language of Deleuze and Guattari, we might say that Kant seeks to 
unearth objective presuppositions, but rather than replace them with implicit and 
subjective ones, he sets out to defend the specific set of presuppositions that he 
requires. Rather than driving presuppositions underground, Kant seeks to make 
them stand on their own.46 
 
This format can be seen recurring throughout the first Critique in relation 
to the three fundamental mental faculties of sensibility, understanding, and 
reason. In regard to sensibility, Kant shows that, while we cannot presume that 
the world as it is in itself has any specific form, we can recognise that all 
sensibility is structured by the forms of space and time. Because space and time 
are the essential forms of our sensibility, we can be sure that all objects presented 
to us in experience – that is to say, all ‘appearances’ – will be both spatially and 
temporally organised. Thus, at the end of the Transcendental Aesthetic, we can 
draw the conclusory-presupposition that space and time are ‘pure a priori 
intuitions’, which we are justified in presupposing as the conditions for all 
possible objects of experience.47 Regarding the faculty of the understanding, Kant 
does something very similar. In the Transcendental Logic, Kant proceeds to show 
that, as well as there being essential forms of the receptivity of impressions, there 
are certain regular features of our conceptual grasping of experience. Just as 
possible objects of experience must conform to our faculty of sensibility, possible 
objects of knowledge must conform to the categories of our understanding. 
 
46 We might ask here whether a well-defended presupposition is still a presupposition at all. 
What justifies the potentially paradoxical name ‘conclusory-presupposition’ is the modality 
of its use in Kant’s philosophy; Kant never naturalises these claims as being factual 
propositions concerning the nature of the world, but is always careful to stipulate that they are 
only ever held provisionally. As will be discussed later in this paper, this is apparent in Kant’s 
distinction between the regulative nature of the ideas of pure reason and the constitutive 
nature of the concepts of the understanding.  
47 CPR, B73. 
Specifically, Kant argues that we can specify twelve ‘pure concepts of the 
understanding which apply a priori to objects of intuition in general’, and which 
are organised under the four categories of ‘quantity’, ‘quality’, ‘relation’, and 
‘modality’.48 It is not my intention here to offer a defence of Kant’s deduction of 
these categories, but simply to point out that the methodology used by Kant to 
provide such a deduction comes to a resolution with what I have been calling 
conclusory-presuppositions. We are justified a priori in presupposing the 
necessity of these concepts, specifically because it is not possible for the 
understanding to operate without them.   
 
I would like to raise two possible concerns at this point, which I will come 
back to at the end of this section. First, we might ask whether, despite what Kant 
argues, his argumentation still relies on an even deeper level of subjective 
presuppositions. For example, doesn’t he take for granted the very operation of 
the understanding when he argues that the concepts of the understanding are 
required for it to function? Might this not be what Deleuze was getting at when 
he charged Kant with presupposing the ‘good nature of thought’?49 Second, we 
might ask whether Kant’s methodology for supplying conclusory presuppositions 
is based on a moral conviction, by which he aims to keep philosophical discourse 
contained within bourgeois conventions. Here the line of argument would be that, 
beneath Kant’s reference to the necessity of a given presupposition, there is a 
moral impetus which rejects the alternative out of a fear of anarchy.50 These two 
issues are connected because, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze will say that 
‘morality alone is capable of persuading us that thought has a good nature’.51  
 
Before we are able to answer these two concerns we must consider Kant’s 
account of the necessary preconditions for the operation of the faculty of reason. 
In Kant’s analysis of this faculty, he follows the same argumentative pattern as in 
the case of sensibility and understanding. Here Kant attempts to show that there 
 
48 CPR, A79-80/B105-106. 
49 DR, p. 175. 
50 See Spangenberg’s claim that, on Deleuze’s account, both Descartes and Kant recognise 
that ‘the presupposition of the good and shareable nature of thought is only by right or in 
principle, and not in fact’, but that Deleuze differs from Kant here because he ‘still insists on 
the ‘dangerous’ and possibly ‘immoral’ path of uncovering and destroying all 
presuppositions’ (‘Thought without an Image’ Deleuzian Philosophy as an Ethics of the 
Event’, Phronimon, 10:1 (2009), p. 91). 
51 DR, p. 175. 
are ‘certain concepts and principles’ which originate in the faculty of reason,52 
which he refers to as either ‘transcendental ideas’ or ‘ideas of pure reason’.53 In 
the final sections of the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant sets out to show that 
reason produces its own illusions when it steps beyond the bounds of its rightful 
domain. Kant then attempts to test the exact boundaries of this domain via the use 
of the paralogisms, the antinomies, and the analysis of the Ideal. Here he shows 
that reason cannot legitimately apply itself to anything which falls outside of the 
bounds of possible experience. As such, there can be no proof in psychology of 
the existence of the unified thinking subject, no proof in cosmology of the unity 
of the world as a whole, and no proof in theology of the existence of God. Despite 
the impossibility of providing such proofs, Kant nonetheless argues that these 
three ideas – namely the self, the world, and God – must be presupposed as 
regulative ideals in order to allow reason to function. 
 
To make things slightly more complex, Kant also discusses the need for a 
more general regulative idea of pure reason, which conditions the three ideas we 
have just discussed. Kant is clear throughout the Critique of Pure Reason that the 
faculties of sensibility, understanding, and reason all support one another in 
various ways. In the case of the latter, Kant will argue that reason serves to unify 
the system of concepts which the understanding must use to unify the object of 
experience: ‘Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in the object by means 
of concepts, so reason unifies the manifold of concepts by means of ideas’.54 
Thus, we see that the three transcendental ideas of pure reason introduced above 
are presupposed to allow for the synthesis of the understanding. Kant adds to this 
the claim that reason carries out this task by ‘positing a certain collective unity as 
the goal of the activities of the understanding’.55 What Kant seems to be saying 
here is that the three regulative ideas of the subject, the world, and God, can only 
operate as regulative ideals at all if reason seeks to unify the understanding. As 
Kant continues: 
 
The law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity, is a necessary 
law, since without it we should have no reason at all, and without reason 
 
52 CPR, A299/B355. 
53 CPR A311/B368; A669/B697. 
54 CPR, B672/A644. 
55 CPR, B672/A644. 
no coherent employment of the understanding, and in the absence of this 
no sufficient criterion of empirical truth.56 
 
Here Kant has provided a kind of transcendental argument for the existence of a 
law, which requires pure reason to at least attempt to unify the concepts of the 
understanding. Kant is claiming that the understanding could not systematically 
organise all possible objects of knowledge under a single set of necessary 
categories, unless reason put the understanding to work in a specific way. 
Furthermore, this law-like activity of reason would not be enough unless reason 
also presupposed the unity of the whole of knowledge. It is for this reason that 
Kant will write:  
 
In order, therefore, to secure an empirical criterion we have no option save 
to presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and 
necessary.57  
 
For Kant, this presupposition cannot simply be a heuristic device.58 We 
must not simply presuppose the unity of nature as a kind of pragmatic but 
 
56 CPR, B679/A651. 
57 CPR, B679/A651. 
58 The question of how to read Kant’s account of this principle is contentious. According to 
Ypi’s distinction, the ‘weak reading’ of Kant’s transcendental ideas makes them ‘no big deal’ 
because it claims that ‘the idea of systematicity of nature only has a heuristic or 
methodological status, with no bearing on the way in which the categories of the 
understanding are applied to create empirical concepts’ (‘The Transcendental Deduction Of 
Ideas In Kant’s Critique Of Pure Reason’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cxvii, 
Part 2 (2017), p. 167). This is a position implicitly accepted by Walker, who claims that the 
deduction of the ideas of pure reason ‘does not seek to show that the world actually contains 
these kinds of unity and completeness’ but only that ‘we are justified in proceeding as if it 
did’ (‘Kant and Transcendental Arguments’, in The Cambridge Companion to Kant and 
Modern Philosophy, ed. by Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 
247). The problem with this view is that it goes against Kant’s claim in the Appendix that we 
must presuppose a priori that the unity which reason seeks is ‘necessarily inherent in the 
objects’ (CPR, B679/A651). A close reading of Kant’s deduction of the transcendental ideas 
shows that the only approach left open to us is the ‘strong reading’, which maintains that 
‘upon further scrutiny’ Kant recognised that ‘reason’s heuristic/subjective use had to be 
grounded on a transcendental principle presupposing the conformity to ends of nature itself’ 
(Ypi, 2017, p. 167). This reading is supported by McLaughlin: ‘While these principles are 
sometimes called ‘heuristic’ by Kant, they are not methodological suggestions justified by 
utility or success in practice. They are normatively constitutive of the rationality of scientific 
practice itself’ (‘Transcendental Presuppositions and Ideas of Reason’, Kant-Studien 105(4) 
ultimately unfounded idea; instead we must genuinely take nature to be inherently 
unified. Kant writes: 
 
It is, indeed, difficult to understand how there can be a logical principle by 
which reason prescribes the unity of rules, unless we also presuppose a 
transcendental principle whereby such a systematic unity is a priori 
assumed to be necessarily inherent in the objects.59 
 
Effectively, in this section of the Critique, which comes at the very end of 
the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant posits the necessity of a regulative ideal even 
more general than the three transcendental ideas of the unity of the subject, of the 
world, and of God. To these three, Kant has added the requirement that we 
presuppose the unity of the whole of knowledge and the concomitant 
presupposition of ‘the systematic unity of nature’. What Kant ultimately argues 
is that the faculty of reason is driven to ask metaphysical questions concerning 
the nature of reality and that, given this context, we are faced with two options: 
either we presuppose the unity of nature, which will allow reason to unify the 
categories of the understanding and will allow us to make metaphysics into a 
science; or we can decide not to presuppose the unity of nature, but this will leave 
the faculty of reason undirected and will allow us to be drawn systematically into 
transcendental illusions. Of course, Kant does not think there are two options here 
at all; we must take the former, because reason – acting as a tribunal for the 
judgment of its own affairs – tells us that the unity of nature must be presupposed.  
 
 We are now in a position to respond to the two issues laid out above, 
namely the possibility that Kant’s transcendental deduction of the unity of reason 
relies on a hidden subjective presupposition concerning the good nature of 
thought, and the possibility that Kant’s deduction of the unity of reason rests on 
an implicit moral conviction concerning the necessity of order over anarchy. In a 
certain sense, Kant has the same answer for both of these accusations: He 
recognises that his method does rely on a presupposition concerning the good 
nature of thought, and that he does presuppose a moral principle as the ground 
for his analysis, but in both cases he argues that these presuppositions are not 
simply posited, but defended by the deduction of the unity of reason. Kant’s claim 
 
(2014), De Gruyter, p. 561, my italics). 
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is that, without making these presuppositions – without assuming that the 
understanding can operate, and without assuming a moral predilection for order 
– it will not be possible to give a systematic account of reason at all. The 
deduction of the transcendental idea of the unity of reason is nothing but Kant’s 
account of the necessity of these presuppositions. This does not mean that he is 
correct. What I am trying to point out here is not that Kant successfully argues for 
his particular, conservative presuppositions about the nature of thought, but 
simply that he does argue for them. This is enough to show that Deleuze’s early 
critique of Kant on the basis of his acceptance of subjective and implicit 
presuppositions misses the mark.  
 
IV. Instituting the Kantian Plane of Immanence  
Thus, Deleuze’s early depiction of Kant’s first critique, as relying on a series of 
implicit presuppositions, mischaracterises Kantian metaphysics by failing to offer 
a full account of Kant’s transcendental deduction of his presuppositions. As we 
noted earlier, while Deleuze and Guattari’s later analysis of Kant in What is 
Philosophy? paints a more positive picture of Kant’s creativity, Deleuze and 
Guattari never relinquish the claim that Kant’s work relies on a series of 
unjustified presuppositions. As mentioned, in the latter text Deleuze and Guattari 
equate what they had previously referred to as an ‘image of thought’ with a ‘plane 
of immanence’.60 In this final section, and in order to offer a potential 
rapprochement between Deleuze and Guattari and Kant, I want to point out an 
ambiguity in Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the production of such a ‘plane 
of immanence’. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari use two terms 
interchangeably to explain the way in which philosophers create such a plane. 
They speak of both ‘presupposing’ a plane of immanence and ‘instituting’ such a 
plane: ‘Philosophy… proceeds by presupposing or by instituting the plane of 
immanence’.61 It is not obvious at this point whether Deleuze and Guattari mean 
to distinguish these two processes, or whether the ‘or’ in this sentence is intended 
to cast these two terms as equivalent. However, I would like to argue that, by 
making a clearer distinction between these two processes, Deleuze and Guattari 
would have been better placed to explain the methodology of Kantian 
metaphysics. Specifically, I will suggest that, via the deduction of the unity of 
 
60 WIP, p. 37. 
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reason, it would be more accurate to say that Kant institutes a plane of immanence 
without simply presupposing it.  
 
Let us look again at the specific nature of the Kantian image of thought that 
Deleuze and Guattari discuss in What is Philosophy?. Here Deleuze and Guattari 
continue to define the Kantian plane of immanence as a development or 
complication of the Cartesian plane:  
 
No doubt Kant constructs a ‘transcendental’ plane that renders doubt 
useless and changes the nature of the presuppositions once again. But it is 
by virtue of this very plane that he can declare that if the ‘I think’ is a 
determination that, as such, implies an undetermined existence (‘I am’), we 
still do not know how this undetermined comes to be determinable and 
hence in what form it appears as determined.62 
 
We can understand this claim about determination as follows: while 
Descartes argues for the indubitability of the thinking subject, Kant asks what the 
necessary preconditions for this subject are. That is to say, given the fact that 
‘[t]he I think must be able to accompany all my representations’, a question 
remains about the way in which the undetermined ‘I’ becomes determinable in 
the act of thinking.63 Kant’s analysis of the cognitive faculties, and his account of 
their interaction, is nothing if not a description of the process by which the 
thinking subject is determined in thought. Kant’s account of the relationship 
between sensibility, understanding and reason, and his account of the 
transcendental presupposition of the unity of reason which allows for the 
harmonious operation of these faculties, should be read as an answer to the 
question of how the thinking subject ‘comes to be determinable and hence in what 
form it appears as determined’.64 With this in mind, we can see that Kant does not 
push the implicit presupposition of a thinking subject back to a transcendental 
plane that remains simply presupposed. On the contrary, Kant replaces the 
presupposition of a thinking subject with a process of instituting which grounds 
 
62 WIP, p. 31. 
63 CPR, B131. 
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the thinking subject, or ‘the transcendental unity of self-consciousness’, by way 
of a transcendental argument.65 
 
Another way of approaching the specific nature of Kant’s attempt to 
institute a new plane of immanence is to pay attention to the political metaphors 
that Kant uses throughout his first critique. In the preface to the A-edition, Kant 
characterises the discipline of philosophy as a kind of society in which 
monarchical power, once held by metaphysics, has collapsed due to the ‘intestine 
wars’ of the ‘government’; after ‘the administration of the dogmatists’ became 
‘despotic’ the ‘sceptics’ were able to break up ‘all civil society’ resulting in 
‘complete anarchy’.66 For Kant, if we wish to have a philosophical discourse at 
all, we must find a way of resolving these conflicts, so that the monarch can be 
returned to her throne, and civil philosophical dialogue can continue. The first 
task of the tribunal that Kant sets up in the first critique is therefore to test the 
legal claims of these different philosophical factions, to give them each their due, 
and to restore peace. One way to read this political characterisation of 
metaphysics, which ties in with my re-reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
underdeveloped distinction between presupposing and instituting a plane of 
immanence, is as follows: Kant can see that the dogmatic use of reason involves 
a series of implicit presuppositions, and that these presuppositions are uncovered 
by the sceptics who therefore put the whole of metaphysics into question. Kant’s 
 
65 CPR, B132. Of course, Descartes’s work has been somewhat instrumentalised here. While 
it is outside the scope of this article to offer a full reassessment of Descartes’s work, it is 
plausible that one could also offer a rereading of Descartes’s supposedly implicit 
presuppositions as having been instituted rather than simply presupposed. To do this, it would 
be important to pay close attention to Descartes’s method of argumentation, and specifically 
to the fact that the Meditations is presented as a meditation. As such, it may be possible to 
argue that the argument used by Descartes to institute his specific image of thought is more 
phenomenological than it is propositional. While Deleuze’s reading of Descartes is very 
sophisticated, it would be interesting to assess whether Deleuze carries out the mode of 
reading that Descartes suggests in his Preface to the reader: ‘I would not urge anyone to read 
this book except those who are able and willing to meditate seriously with me, and to 
withdraw their minds from the senses and from all preconceived opinions... Those who do 
not bother to grasp the proper order of my arguments and the connection between them, but 
merely try to carp at individual sentences, as is the fashion, will not get much benefit from 
reading this book’ (René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, With Selections from the 
Objections and Replies, ed. and trans. by John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p. 13). With this in mind, one might claim that Descartes’s repeated 
reformulations of the cogito in the second meditation are designed to institute the set of 
presuppositions required for the subsequent claims to be intelligible.  
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aim is to ground the legitimacy of reason not on dogmatic or presuppositional 
grounds, but through a process of critique which will provide institutional 
grounds for the constitutional monarchy of metaphysics.67 
 
On this reading, the difference between ‘presupposing’ and ‘instituting’, as 
it is introduced by Deleuze and Guattari, can be read as the equivalent to the 
distinction I made earlier between Kant’s prefatory and conclusory 
presuppositions. To institute a plane of immanence would then be nothing other 
than to provide an argument for the necessity of a specific set of presuppositions. 
With this distinction in mind, we are able to make sense of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
claim that, ‘although the plane is presupposed by philosophy, it is nonetheless 
instituted by it’.68 In the case of Kant’s first critique, we should say that, while in 
a certain sense Kant does presuppose a particular image of thought – in which 
reason unifies the understanding, which in turn unifies sensibility, and allows for 
the determination of the unity of the thinking subject – this plane of immanence 
is nonetheless instituted by Kant by way of his transcendental deduction of the 
unity of reason. 
 
This reading is not only beneficial in that it allows us to reconcile the 
complexity of Kant’s metaphysical approach with Deleuze and Guattari’s meta-
philosophical analysis of presuppositions. It is also useful because it shines a light 
on the nature of metaphysics. What this reading suggests is that, in order to avoid 
a dogmatic reliance on subjective or implicit presuppositions about what it means 
to think, any metaphysical system must provide an argument for the necessity of 
a specific image of thought. In this paper I have tried to leave open the question 
of whether Kant’s own attempt to do this was successful, but what I have tried to 
show is that one of the lessons we can learn from Kant, and from Deleuze and 
 
67 For more on Kant’s political metaphors see D. W. Tarbet, ‘The Fabric of Metaphor in 
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divine law, see To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, trans. by Ted Humphrey 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003); and for an analysis of Kant’s impact on constitutional reforms 
in Prussia, see Matthew Levinger, ‘Kant And The Origins Of Prussian Constitutionalism’, 
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Guattari’s engagement with him, is that for metaphysics to justify itself it must 
institute rather than presuppose the plane of immanence on which it operates.  
 
